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Since Malthus wrote his famous Essay on Population, the world has witnessed
great improvements in numerous measures of well-being Ð life expectancy, infant
mortality, incidence of famines and plagues, per capita food consumption as well
as real per capita incomes. These improvements have come about during rapid
population growth in both industrial and developing countries. Food demand and
supply projections suggest that growth of supply will fully meet growth of
consumption while grain prices continue to decline. While China may increase
grain imports early next century, Central and Eastern Europe is likely to emerge
as a major grain exporter and thus help to meet the increase in China's imports.
The past two centuries, and especially the last half century, have witnessed
dramatic improvements in the well-being of the world's population, unpar-
alleled in human history. This is especially true of the increases in per
capita food consumption. Other measures of well-being, however, such as
life expectancy and freedom from famine, have also shown marked
progress. Yet, during recent years, claims have been made that the world
is (or soon will be) overpopulated. Some have claimed that the growth of
world demand for food will soon outpace the growth of supply. The fact
that similar claims, made over the past three decades, have all proved to
be false seems always to be forgotten.
Reputable studies of prospective food supply and demand conclude that
there will be continued improvement in per capita food consumption,
especially in the developing countries (see Islam 1995). Yet the projections
of doom and gloom continue to make headlines and receive media
attention. The potential accuracy of such projections seems irrelevant since
notice depends solely on the emphasis on possible disaster while more
sober and well documented studies receive little attention in the world's
press.
That pessimism makes news is well illustrated by the fact that Thomas
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production and population. Food production, he said, increases arithmet-
ically while population, if unchecked, increases geometrically. Thus,
population always has the potential to outrun food supply. At the time
this statement was made, his view was that population could only be held
in check by vice and misery Ð starvation, disease or war. But, this is the
Malthus of the ®rst edition.
1 He soon revised his views, yet hardly anyone
noticed or remembers that he came to agree with those who, before the
®rst edition of his essay, believed that there would be continuing improve-
ment in the well-being of people.
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1. Population and well-being since Malthus' ®rst edition
In no other two centuries has the well-being of mankind ever been so
enhanced as in those since Malthus' ®rst edition was published in 1798. In
fact, we can say that there has been more improvement in well-being since
then, as indicated by a large number of conventional measures, than in all
of prior history. Choose whatever objective measure you wish Ð life
expectancy, infant mortality, the incidence of famines and plagues, per
capita food consumption, per capita real incomes or per capita levels of
real consumption, or biological measures such as height or weight or ratios
of weight to height Ð improvements during the past two centuries swamp
those of the previous millennia.
While the nineteenth century followed the path laid out in the revised
1The original text was written in 1797. Malthus revised it for editions published in 1803,
1806, 1807, 1817 and 1826. See Malthus (1826).
2The principle of population is that, if unchecked, population will grow faster than the
means of subsistence. After noting that `everything depends upon the relative proportion
between population and food, and not on the absolute number of people', he adds that he
believes `that countries which possessed the fewest people often suered the worst from the
eects of the principle of population' (p. 330).
The fundamental change in the revised editions was to introduce another check to
population growth. The preface to the 1803 and all subsequent editions included the
following: `Throughout the whole of the present work, I have so far diered in principle
from the former, as to suppose another check to population growth, which does not come
under the head either of vice or misery; and in the latter part I have endeavoured to soften
some of the harshest conclusions of the ®rst essay' (p. 9). The new preventive check to
population was due to a combination of laws and institutions and self-love or self-interest:
`To the laws of property and marriage, and to the apparently narrow principle of self-love
(or self-interest), which prompts each individual to exert himself in bettering his condition,
we are indebted for all the noblest exertions of human genius, for everything that distin-
guishes the civilized from the savage state. A strict inquiry into the principle of population
leads us strongly to the conclusion that we shall never be able to throw down the ladder by
which we have risen to this eminence; but it by no means proves that we may not rise
higher by the same means' (p. 331).
D. Gale Johnson 2
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997editions, that century saw much less progress than the current century.
That was due, in considerable part, to the rapid growth of urbanization
which brought with it diseases that caused great suering and loss of life.
The large increase in human migrations that came with the industrial
revolution resulted in the spread of disease on a scale seldom seen before.
Even so, there were modest improvements in well-being, at least among
signi®cant segments of the population (Fogel 1992). But it was the steps
taken near the end of the nineteenth century in providing clean water,
improving sanitation, combined with the beginnings of knowledge
concerning the transmission and prevention of disease, that made possible
the spectacular gains in life expectancy that have occurred in the current
century.
The improvements in well-being that came in the last century were
intimately related to the agricultural revolutions in North America and
Europe. It was also during that century that the discovery of labour-saving
farm implements made possible the transfer of labour from agriculture and
into other pursuits that converted cities into productive enterprises and
permitted their rapid growth.
All this has been accomplished while population grew at the most rapid
rate in the recorded history of the world. It is seldom recognized that
world population growth was less than 0.2 per cent annually from about
500 BC to about AD 1400 and did not exceed 0.5 per cent until the middle
Table 1 Expectation of life at birth for six European
countries and Massachusetts in the United States: 1840
to 1955
Year Expectation of life Average annual













Source: United Nations, Population Bulletin, no. 6, table IV.1,
1962.
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slowly through the seventeenth century, with the most rapid rates of
economic growth generally occurring in the countries with the highest rates
of population growth. Throughout the nineteenth century and until about
World War II, population growth rates in the industrial countries were
greater than in the developing countries (table 1). Only after World War II
did the developing countries have the higher rates of population growth
and only then did their per capita income growth exceed that of the indus-
trial countries. From 1850 to 1920 population in the developing countries
grew approximately 0.5 per cent annually. Subsequently the rate exceeded
1 per cent, but remained at less than 1.5 per cent until 1950.
The period of rapid population growth in the developing economies
began in 1950, when growth exceeded 2 per cent for three decades. It was
also between 1950 to 1980 that the rates of growth of real per capita
incomes were greater in the developing than in the developed countries
and the highest ever achieved in the developing countries or in the
developed countries as a group. From 1750 to 1920, population grew more
rapidly in the developed than the developing countries and per capita
income growth was greater in the developed countries. Contrary to the
relationship between population growth and economic growth implicit in
the reasoning of those who favour slow or zero population growth,
economic growth, as measured by the growth of real per capita incomes,
has been highest during periods of rapid population growth.
Maddison (1995) provides estimates of per capita GDP for most major
countries, starting in 1820. He provides estimates for eleven Asian
countries, which may be used to indicate the experience of the developing
countries from 1820 to 1950. Over that period of more than a century, it is
estimated that the eleven Asian countries increased their real per capita
gross domestic product by only 25 per cent, from $609 to $863, while their
population increased by 84 per cent (at an annual rate of less than 0.5 per
cent). From 1950 to 1992 the Asian countries' average per capita income
rose to $5300, a ®vefold increase, while population increased by 128 per
cent (an annual rate of almost 3 per cent).
For the twelve Western European countries Maddison estimates that
real per capita income increased from $1228 in 1820 to $5513 in 1950,
with population increasing by 131 per cent (an annual growth rate of
approximately 0.65 per cent). The real per capita income of the United
States grew from $1287 in 1820 to $9573 in 1950 at an annual rate of 1.56
per cent, much less than the growth rate in developing economies from
1950 to 1980.
The eleven Asian countries included Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. It
may be useful to review the data for the two large Asian countries, namely
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same real per capita incomes in 1820 Ð $523 and $531, respectively. And
they had almost the same per capita incomes in 1950 Ð $614 and $597.
These data indicate the absence of a signi®cant increase in real per capita
income for more than a century. From 1950 to 1992, China and India
followed quite dierent paths, with the Chinese average increasing to
$3098 and India's to $1348, most of the dierence arising in the past 15
years.
3 But even at India's much slower pace of growth in a period of 42
years, India more than doubled its real per capita income after an increase
of a tenth in the previous 130 years. And its population grew much more
rapidly in the recent than the earlier period Ð by a factor of approx-
imately four.
A measure of improvement in well-being that merits serious attention is
change in life expectancy as well as various measures of infant and child
mortality. Mortality, or life expectancy, was roughly constant throughout
history until 1650 when, according to Bogue (1969, p. 566), the average
expectation of life was 25 years or less. The infant mortality rate was
about 30 per cent. Data from Roman tombstones indicate that life expect-
ancy was about 20 to 30 years during the period of the Roman empire,
giving some support to the view that for a millennium there had been little
or no change in life expectancy. Data for six European countries and
Massachusetts indicate that, as of 1840, life expectancy in high-income
countries was 41 years (Bogue 1969, p. 567). Some 60 years later life
expectancy had increased to 50.5 years, an increase of less than ten years.
In the next 55 years Ð to 1955 Ð life expectancy increased to 71 years, an
absolute increase twice that achieved in the previous 60 years.
Swedish data are available on infant mortality, starting in 1750 (Bogue
1969). Until the beginning of the nineteenth century infant mortality
exceeded 20 per cent, in some years going as high as 25 per cent. Infant
mortality did not go below 15 per cent until 1850 and reached 10 per cent
only at the beginning of this century. At the present time the available
data indicate that there is now only one country with infant mortality
rates exceeding 15 per cent (the Swedish level as of 1850) and many devel-
oping countries are now at or below 5 per cent (which was reached in
3In 1978, the year before the start of the Chinese economic reforms, the per capita GDPs
were $1352 for China and $972 for India ± a dierence of only 39 per cent in China's
favour. In 1992 the dierent was 130 per cent in China's favour. India's population grew
by 36 per cent over the period while China's grew 22 per cent. Even if we assumed that the
additional population contributed nothing to GDP and we subtract their consumption, the
dierence in population growth rates would account for less than about 15 percentage
points of the increase in the ratio of Chinese to Indian per capita incomes.
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4 The average infant mortality rate for all low-income
countries is now less than 6 per cent.
The rapid world population growth after World War II was due almost
entirely to a sharp decline in mortality, rather than to an increase in
fertility. In fact, fertility has declined almost everywhere. It seems incon-
gruous that there has been so much concern about rapid world population
growth during the last half of this century, since it has been due primarily
to improvements in health and thus the length of life, something that
mankind struggled for centuries to achieve. I can think of nothing that
reduced suering more than reducing infant mortality, from when one out
of every three children died before a year of age to the present when most
mothers in the world are confronted with a continuously declining loss
rate, now smaller than one in twenty.
2. Population an unimportant factor in determining well-being
The evidence is now overwhelming that the rate of population growth is a
relatively unimportant factor in determining the well-being of a nation's
people. As I wrote earlier:
population is but one among many factors that determines well-being
and that it is far from the most important factor. National policies that
adversely aect the eciency with which the human and natural
resources of a country are utilized are far, far more important than
population growth. (Johnson 1990, pp. 29±30)
I would not rule out that, within reasonable limits (say 1 to 2 per cent
annual growth rates), population growth may have a positive in¯uence on
per capita income growth. This view is supported by Kremer (1993) who
argues that technological change has been a function of population size
and thus population growth has not had a deleterious eect on per capita
economic growth. He does not, for this reason, argue for pronatalist
policies. Nor do I. But he does conclude:
that economists should conduct further research to measure the growth
and welfare eects of population growth under nonrival technology,
rather than simply following conventional wisdom and concentrating on
the negative eects of population growth. (p. 713)
Recent evidence from world developments should have created doubts
4See World Bank (1996, p. 198).
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capita incomes. Evidence points strongly to the importance of policies and
institutions and the unimportance of population growth rates. The
economic experience of the socialist countries oers a real world test.
Dierent rates of economic growth were achieved in socialist and market
economies that were once part of the same countries. The role of popula-
tion growth can explain little or nothing of the dierences in per capita
income growth that occurred in North and South Korea, East and West
Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary and Austria. Or, for that matter,
in China, before and after 1979, when major economic reforms were
undertaken. It may be noted that population growth rates were lower in
the socialist than in the market economies in Europe, but this seemed not
to matter. Olson (1996) has argued persuasively that policies do matter,
that most countries have not come close to achieving maximum ecient
use of their resources. The recent large body of empirical work on the
eects of openness to world markets, political stability, and education on
economic growth support that conclusion. See, for example, Levine and
Renelt (1992) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
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3. Will we like negative population growth rates?
We are likely to see a real world test of whether negative rates of popula-
tion growth lead to more rapid growth of real per capita incomes in the
near future. All the countries in Western and Central Europe now have
fertility rates below the replacement level and will face absolute declines in
population over the next decade or two unless fertility increases or
5Please note that I do not argue that the rate of population growth has no eect on the
rate of per capita economic growth. I do not know for sure what the eects have been or
are under all circumstances and conditions. What I believe is that there are many factors
that aect people's welfare and that, even if population growth has a negative eect on per
capita real income growth, it is very small and much less important than factors such as
investment in schooling or the extent of governmental intervention in markets. I do say
that one cannot and should not derive a negative relationship between population and
economic growth rates from neo-classical growth models. True, diminishing returns to
labour cannot be avoided, but the relationships between population and economic growth
are far more complex than implied by diminishing returns alone or any of the other
variables normally included in such models. Factors such as innovation and discovery, total
investment including investment in human capital, increasing returns to scale and the rate
at which new methods of production are adopted appear to be positively related to popula-
tion density and numbers. Because population growth can be, and probably is to some
degree, endogenous in its relationship to real per capita incomes, empirical analyses that
indicate a positive relationship between the two variables must be interpreted with caution.
But the same must be said for the few empirical studies that have found a negative relation-
ship between population and real income growth rates.
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changes in age distribution that accompany declining populations, I
anticipate that the population problem that will attract the public's
attention in these countries is that of too low a rate of fertility rather than
one that is too high.
Those who place emphasis on natural resource scarcity and environ-
mental degradation will have diculty accepting the conclusion that
negative population growth can have adverse long-term consequences.
What needs to be recognized is that many environmental problems are
ameliorated or solved as real per capita incomes increase. I am referring
here to the important environmental problems in the developing countries
of unclean water and unsafe disposal of human excrement. But other
forms of environmental damage are also reduced with higher incomes. Air
pollution abatement, the creation of parks and the reduction of deforesta-
tion all rise in volume once the level of real per capita incomes reach a
relatively low threshold level (World Bank 1992, p. 54; Antle and Heide-
brink 1995).
4. Recent world food developments
The increases in world grain prices during 1996 followed an extended
period of slow growth in world grain production. This led to some degree
of alarm concerning the continued improvement in per capita food
supplies in the developing countries. An outlandish argument has been
made that China may starve the world due to an actual decline in grain
production and rapid increase in grain use over the next three or four
decades (Brown 1995). Given the proclivity of the world's press to revel in
disaster, this argument has received considerable attention. But before
turning to my own view of what the future may hold, let us brie¯y
summarize the developments of the past three or so decades.
Table 2 presents data on the daily per capita supply of calories for
major world regions for 1961±63 and selected years to the most recent
period for which FAO data are available. For the developing regions as a
whole the daily caloric supply increased by 28 per cent in approximately
three decades. The average availability is well above the average daily
requirements for the developing countries, though this in no way assures
that all or even most persons in a given region have an adequate diet. This
is particularly true in Africa which has seen little increase in calories over
the three decades. The improvement in calories' availability in developing
regions has none the less been associated with a signi®cant decline in the
percentage of the population classi®ed as malnourished. The percentage so
classi®ed declined from 36 in 1969±71 to 20 in 1988±90 and is projected to
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individuals malnourished fell from 941 million in 1969±71 to 781 million
in 1988±90 and is projected to decline to less than 650 million by 2010
(Alexandratos 1995, p. 33). Moreover, it is generally recognized that
poverty rather than the absence of food has been and will continue to be
the primary cause of malnutrition.
The data on the increase in life expectancy, and the decline in infant and
child mortality in developing countries since 1960, signal a signi®cant
improvement in the availability and eective use of the food supply.
Increased access to clean water and improved sanitation have contributed
as much as, or perhaps more than, increased availability of food to the
decline in infant and child mortality. But whatever the relative contribu-
tions, these changes have bene®ted millions of the world's poorest people.
We are frequently reminded that world per capita grain production
peaked in 1984 and has failed to regain that level (Islam 1995). It is not
true, however, that world per capita food production failed to increase
during the 1980s. The 4.6 per cent growth in food output per capita was
only slightly below the 5.7 per cent for the prior decade. But in the devel-
oping regions, per capita food production increased by 13 per cent in the
1980s, signi®cantly more than the 8 per cent increase for the previous
decade. The growth of per capita food output for the developing countries
in the 1980s was dominated by the three most populous countries Ð
China, 28 per cent; India, 20 per cent; and Indonesia, 32 per cent.
Taking grain alone, production in the developing countries did increase
during the 1980s Ð by 9 per cent. The slowdown in world grain produc-
Table 2 Daily per capita supply of calories for major world regions, 1961±
63 and selected years to 1988±90
1961±63 1969±71 1979±81 1988±90
Developing, all 1940 2117 2324 2473
Africa 2117 2138 2180 2204
Latin America 2363 2502 2693 2690
Near East 1825 2029 2245 2442
Other, ROW 2116 2292 2425 2626
Developed, all
North America 3054 3235 3330 3603
Europe 3088 3239 3371 3452
Oceania 3173 3287 3157 3328
Former USSR 3146 3323 3368 3380
Other, ROW 2545 2722 2812 2975
Source: FAO, Production Yearbook, various issues.
On the resurgent population and food debate 9
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997tion occurred in the industrial countries of Western Europe, North
America and in the former socialist countries. During the 1980s the
European Union, the United States and Japan followed policies designed
to limit the production of grain.
Even if world grain production grew slowly during the 1980s and early
1990s, the supply of grain grew more rapidly than did the world's demand
for grain during the period.
6 We know this because international market
prices for wheat, maize and rice have fallen since the 1970s, even relative
to the prices of traded manufactures (®gure 1). Why did grain production
grow at a signi®cant rate under these adverse conditions? It is something
of a miracle that world per capita grain production was approximately
maintained.
6I refer to supply and demand in terms of the shifts in the functions over time. The
decline in real grain prices occurred because the rightward shift of the supply function was
greater than the shift in the demand function.
Figure 1 The trend of grain relative to manufactures prices in international trade
Note: Wheat prices are calendar year averages for Canadian Western Red Spring export
prices, in store, St Lawrence. Rice prices are calendar year average prices for Thai 5 per
cent broken, Board of Trade posted price, fob Bangkok. Maize prices are calendar year
average prices for US No. 2, Yellow, fob Gulf Ports. De¯ator is the G-5 Manufacturing
Unit Value Index.
Source: International Economics Department, the World Bank.
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excluding China, declined. There was, ®rst of all, a concerted eort on the
part of the US and the EC to reduce government-held and subsidized
stocks. And, second, given the declining trend of prices, there seemed little
prospect that private stockholding would be pro®table. The real annual
cost of holding stocks is high Ð close to 20 per cent of the value of the
grain Ð so price would have to double to provide a normal return on
holding grain over four years.
7 It is dicult to understand why quite
minor deviations from the long-term trends in real prices have caused so
much excitement. What nearly everyone failed to notice was how low
prices of grain have been since the mid-1980s and especially in the ®rst
four years of this decade.
5. Prospects Ð future supply and demand for food
The supply of food over the next two to three decades will increase at least
as fast as the demand for food and probably somewhat faster, leading to a
continuation of the long-run decline in real grain prices. The basis for this
belief is strong evidence that the rate of growth of demand for food in the
three decades from 1990 to 2020 will be signi®cantly less than the growth
from 1960 to 1990. The primary reason for this slower demand growth is
that the population growth rate is now slower than it was for the previous
three decades and demographers predict that there will be a further
reduction in the growth rate for the period to 2020. The population projec-
tion is the medium UN projection. Over the past quarter century, the UN
medium projection has been a remarkably accurate predictor of the 2000
world population.
Table 3 presents a projection of world grain use over 1990±2020 in
terms of annual rates of growth, with comparisons to actual developments
for 1960±1990. The only dierence between the two periods aecting the
growth of grain use is the reduction in population growth rates. The
annual rate for 1960±1990 was 1.9 per cent per year; the UN medium
projection is 1.3. The income elasticity of consumption is assumed to be
unchanged in the `B' projection as is the growth rate for per capita
income. The resulting projections of grain use indicate a decline by a
fourth in the annual rate of growth. The worst is over.
The world food supply can more than keep pace with world food
demand in the years ahead according to the conclusions of three indepen-
7It is clear from ®gure 1 that the recent increases in international grain prices are modest
blips on the long-term declining real price trend. The real price of wheat, for example, in
early 1996 was lower than any annual price from 1970 through 1985.
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Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). These were studies done by
researchers at FAO, the World Bank and IFPRI. There was a remarkable
degree of consistency in the results, which are summarized in a book
edited by Islam (1995). The studies indicate a range in the growth rate of
grain use for 1990 to 2010 of 1.4 to 1.6 per cent per year and the midpoint
is included in table 3 as projection `A' as applying to 1990 to 2020.
In so doing, I assume that the third decade will have the same rate of
population growth and income growth and variables aecting use as the
®rst two. Because population will grow more slowly in the last decade, the
`A' projection is likely to be on the high side. As indicated, most of the
increase in consumption will be due to population change.
The annual increase in world per capita grain use in the consensus `A'
projection is very small Ð in the range of 0.1 to 0.2 per cent but this
®gure is largely irrelevant. What is relevant is the rate of increase in the
developing countries. The annual growth is projected to be 0.5 per cent for
a total increase of 16 per cent.
Concern has been expressed that further improvements in agricultural
output may be subject to greater technical constraints than has been true
in the past. Two comments seem relevant here. The ®rst is that the rate of
growth of demand for food will be signi®cantly slower over the next three
decades than for the past three. Consequently, even if it proves somewhat
more dicult to increase output in the future than in the past, this does







Population (per cent) 1.90 1.30 1.30
Income per capita (per cent) 1.8 n.a. 1.8
Income elasticity
a 0.31 n.a. 0.31
Per capita growth of grain use (per cent) 0.56 0.15 0.56
Total growth of grain use (per cent) 2.46 1.55 1.86
Notes:
aSince price changes were ignored, this is the elasticity of world per capita use of grain for
all purposes with respect to world per capita income. Estimates for 1960±90 are trend, rather than
annual point to point rates.
bProjection A takes the projected average rate of per capita grain use growth from the three studies
surveyed by Islam (1995).
cProjection B adopts the rate of per capita grain use growth observed over 1960±90.
Sources: 1960±1990 for growth rates: World Bank, World Development Report 1992 and FAO, Produc-
tion Yearbook, various issues.
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grow more slowly than demand.
The second is that, so far, there is no evidence of a slowdown in the rate
of growth of per capita food production in the developing countries. The
growth of per capita food production in the developing countries in the
1980s was 13 per cent, signi®cantly higher than the 8 per cent in the
previous decade (FAO 1991). Some observers place great emphasis on the
fact that world per capita grain production has declined since 1984. People
do not live by grain alone and, as the diets of people of the developing
countries have improved, other foods have been given increased emphasis
in diets. In any case, per capita grain production in the developing
countries increased by 9 per cent during the 1980s (FAO 1991).
6. Implications for world trade
World trade in grain showed little growth after 1980, following a doubling
during the 1970s. Since 1980 world trade has moved in a range of approx-
imately plus or minus 20 million tons from a rough average of 200 million
tons. Even when the USSR imported 40 million tons annually in the late
1980s, world grain trade could not break out of a narrow range. I see little
prospect for a signi®cant growth in world grain trade during the next
decade.
8 Trade will not be supply constrained but will continue to be
constrained by demand growth.
Much attention has been focused on the possibility of very large grain
imports by China. While outlandish claims such as that by Brown (1995)
suggest that imports might be as much as 200 million to 300 million tons,
responsible projections put the level of imports at 40±45 million tons over
the next two or three decades (Lin, Huang and Rozelle 1996; Huang,
Rozelle and Rosegrant 1995; Koo, Low and R.G. Johnson 1996).
Scenarios leading to both higher and lower levels of grain imports have
been developed by Lin, Huang and Rozelle. Some of the higher ones
would, however, require serious policy errors by the Chinese government.
While such policy errors cannot be ruled out, given recent counterproduct-
ive grain market and price policies, large grain imports would be likely to
®nally convince policy-makers that it was at long last necessary to do
something to increase agricultural productivity rather than just talk about
doing something, as has been the case recently. Agricultural research has
been an important factor in the success of Chinese agriculture over the
8The three studies project increases in world grain trade of from 80 million to more than
100 million tons for 1990±2020 surveyed by Islam (1995, pp. 86±7).
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1980s, grain imports could increase signi®cantly. But there is evidence that
the bene®ts of agricultural research are being recognized and there have
been modest increases in funding in recent years.
An increase in China's annual grain imports to 40 or 50 million tons
could be readily supplied, even at real prices as low as or lower than those
of the early 1990s. In fact, there is a possibility that the traditional grain
exporters will see rather little expansion in demand for their exports. This
will be the case if grain production in the territory of the former USSR
returns to the amount of grain in the ®elds to the level of the late 1980s
when the grain harvest ranged from 180 million to 200 million tons (clean
basis).
9 Reduction of waste in harvesting, transportation, and marketing
and in seed use, combined with increased yields of forage crops (hay,
silage and feed roots) and improved eciency in feed conversion into meat
and milk could increase the available supply of grain by at least 55 million
tons (Johnson 1993, pp. 27±8).
Of nearly equal importance is the reduction in the internal demand for
grain due to the decline in livestock output. In the USSR, the demand for
meat and milk was boosted by large consumer subsidies. In the late 1980s
such subsidies equalled 10 per cent of GNP.
10 The production of meat has
already declined sharply Ð by more than 40 per cent Ð and the adjust-
ment is not yet complete, especially for beef (ERS 1996, p. 20). The former
USSR has sharply reduced its grain imports and perhaps as early 1997, the
area will become a net exporter of grain if crops continue to develop well.
As real incomes recover, there will be some recovery in meat and milk
9While returning to the same level of grain production as occurred in the late 1980s may
seem to be an easily reached objective, it needs to be noted that, under the socialist system,
grain may have been produced where it will not be pro®table to do so in a market system.
For example, the geographic pattern of grain prices deviated signi®cantly from those in a
market system ± prices did not re¯ect dierential costs of transportation and market but
were in¯uenced by costs of production. This meant, for example, that prices of grain in
Kazakhstan were higher than in the Ukraine. Once the grain market is a competitive one,
the grain sown area will probably decline and some yield increases will be required to
achieve the same level of grain output as in the late 1980s.
10In the USSR retail prices of meat and milk products in the late 1980s and early 1990s
covered less than half the cost of bringing these products to the retail store. Consequently,
when the subsidies were removed, there was a sharp decline in the pro®tability of livestock
production and output fell sharply. Consumer subsidies also existed in the socialist
economies of Central Europe, though generally at not quite as high rates as in the USSR.
Livestock production has also fallen in the Central European economies with an eect on
their grain utilization. Future consumption of livestock and poultry products will be signi-
®cantly less than in the 1980s, possibly declining by as much as a third once livestock
production returns to pro®tability and consumers bear the real costs of what they
consume.
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tion will recover to much more than two-thirds of its level of approxi-
mately 20 million tons in the late 1980s. I have estimated that system
change would increase grain availability by 55 million tons and the
reduction in feed use due to decreased livestock consumption would
amount to 35 million tons (Johnson 1993). If these are realistic estimates,
then the territory of the former USSR would shift from being a net
importer of nearly 40 million tons of grain in the late 1980s to a net
exporter of 40 million to 50 million tons, perhaps soon after the turn of
the century.
11
The productivity gains from system change have so far been less than I
have assumed but the decline in consumption of livestock products has
been signi®cantly greater. Consequently, grain imports have nearly disap-
peared sooner than most observers expected. The signi®cant grain exports
may also emerge sooner than expected. I can think of nothing that could
contribute more to the development of a pro®table agriculture in the
former USSR than the emergence of substantial grain exports in the early
years of the next century.
Consequently, in viewing the future of international trade in grain and
food, it is inappropriate to concentrate attention on China to the exclusion
of another area that has a great potential for in¯uencing international
trade. Major changes aecting grain trade are taking place in Central and
Eastern Europe and these changes are large relative to what I consider to
be reasonable projections of China's grain imports.
12
11If this were not enough bad news for the traditional grain exporters, there is a reason-
able prospect that the former socialist countries of Central Europe will have signi®cant
grain exports within the decade. A recent study (ERS 1996) projects that these countries
will export almost 12 million tons by 2005 (p. 13). This is a shift from a net import
position of several million tons in the late 1980s.
12This paper has not re¯ected any of the diculties of projecting future supply and
demand for grain due to known and possible inaccuracies in China's agricultural data. The
cultivated area and yield used in all of the projections have been based on data currently
published by the government, even though it is now admitted that instead of the cultivated
area being about 95 million hectares it is about 125 million hectares. If one accepts the
ocial grain output estimates, this means that grain yields have been overestimated by
about 30 per cent, leaving a larger margin for further increases in yield than has been
assumed to be likely. On the other hand, there is some reason to believe that grain output
has been underestimated in recent years, perhaps by as much as 10 per cent (Johnson,
1994; OECD 1996, p. 163). My conclusion that grain output may have been underestimated
is based on the results of the rural household surveys. To add further uncertainty, the data
on meat production and on meat consumption dier by as much as 50 per cent. If one
accepts the meat production data, per capita consumption was more than 35 kilograms in
1994 while the per capita consumption data indicate an average of no more than 17
kilograms though this estimate may include only meat consumed in the home (State Statist-
ical Bureau of China 1995).
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My message is a simple one. There is little prospect that the factors
aecting world food supply and demand can either stop the decline in real
market prices for grain or result in more than a modest increase in world
grain trade. While China may emerge as a signi®cant importer of grain, it
is at least as likely that Central and Eastern Europe will emerge as major
net grain exporters, competing with the traditional exporters. Although the
probable future path of real world grain prices represents good news for
urban consumers, farmers in the developing countries will be under
continuous pressure to adjust to the declining prices.
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